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NOTES
THE JUDICIAL ALTERATION AND TERMINATION OF PRIVATE

TRUSTS-The law can be seen in few aspects more paternalistic than
in the administration of trusts. At bottom, of course, a court confronted with a problem of trust administration, is concerned with only
two questions: first, what did the settlor intend; second, can we, in
the circumstances of the case, give effect to his intention? But what
if the settlor's scheme for effecting his intention proves an impractical
one, either from the very beginning or after a period of successful
administration? What if some unforeseen contingency occurs which
renders the settlor's scheme a futile, or even a fatal, one if further
pursued? It was this problem that the New Jersey Court of Chancery
had to meet in the recent case of New Jersey National Trust Co. v.
Lincoln Mortgage & Title Guaranty Co. et al.1
In this case the bank was trustee for the holders of more than
$i3,ooo,ooo worth of interest-bearing bonds of the mortgage company.
The bonds were secured by first mortgages held by that company and
pledged to the trustee. Under the terms of the trust indenture, the
mortgage company.was bound to maintain the trust fund at .n aggregate at least equal to the aggregate of the outstanding bonds. When
a mortgage became six months in arrears as to interest, the mortgage
company was bound to substitute another for it. As a result of depression in real estate values, the mortgage company found itself unable
to give the trustee eligible collateral: some of the mortgages it gave
were, contrary to the terms of the trust, for more than 6o per cent.
of the values of the premises mortgaged; others were mortgages made
by a subsidiary of the mortgage company (incorporated to make the
purchases at foreclosure sales) and so essentially mortgages made by
the mortgage company itself instead of by bona fide borrowers; and
in a very large number of cases there had been defaults of more than
six months' standing in the payment of interest, taxes, or insurance
premiums. In the circumstances the court had three courses open to
it: it might have allowed the trustee formally to declare the mortgage
company in default (as it might under the indenture), sell the col-.
lateral, and-as in all probability would be necessary-purchase the
mortgaged premises and carry them until they could be advantageously
sold-a course deemed inadvisable by the court; it might leave the
trust untouched and allow the application (already filed) to declare
the mortgage company bankrupt to take its ordinary course; or it
might allow the trustee's petition to accept a senior participation in
any mortgages of the mortgage company to the extent of 6o per cent.
of the property mortgaged. Finding that the last course afforded the
1148 AtI. 713 (N. J. 1930).
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greatest protection to the bondholders it authorized the trustees to
adopt it.'
The court speaks in the National Bank case of the "emergent
situation" in which the trustee finds itself. The same idea is present
in the earlier New Jersey case of Pennington v. MetropolitanMuseum
of Art 3 where a testator had left real and personal property in trust
to apply the income, inter alia, for the benefit of two infants during
their joint lives; on the death of the survivor the entire estate to go
to the museum. The income proving insufficient to meet the taxes
and other impositions thereon (as testator had directed) the court
granted the museum's petition that it be put in immediate possession
of the real estate in trust on its undertaking to exonerate the trustees
from the taxes and other impositions, stating in clear language what
may briefly be termed the "doctrine of necessity":
"It cannot . . . be open to doubt that a court of equity, in

dealing with trusts, has a right to break in upon and thwart the
expressed will of the creator of the trust in some cases . . .
If trustees disclose a situation of their trust in which a slavish
adherence to the terms of the trust will operate to wholly prevent
the benefits intended by its creator, and they seek instructions
and directions as to their duty, I think that instructions and
directions for a course of conduct which, though differing from
that prescribed by the terms of the trust, will actually carry out
the intent of the creator, may well be founded upon and sustained by the necessity of the case. The benefits intended for the
beneficiaries are the main subjects of consideration. The modes
in which these benefits may be attained are incidental, and necessity may require a change of mode to produce the intended
effect."

4

The court will go to great lengths in some cases to safeguard
the beneficiaries' interests. In one case, where the interests of infants
were at stake, it went so far as to order the sale of both their equitable
interest pur autre vie and their absolute remainder." In another case
equity took jurisdiction where the interests were those of a life tenant
and a remainderman, both absolute, and not equitable; finding that
the life tenant could not secure enough income from the property to
pay the taxes on it, it appointed a trustee to sell for the benefit of
. The court's order was temporary, a date being fixed for making it permanent, all bondholders in the meanwhile to be given the opportunity to express
their views.
165 N. J. Eq. i, 55 AtI. 468 (19o3).
' Supra note 3 at 22, 55 Atl. at 472.
'Richards v. East Tennessee, etc. Ry. Co., io6 Ga. 614, 623, 33 S. E. 193,
197 (1899). "In all suits or legal proceedings, of whatever nature, in which the
personal or property rights of a minor are involved, the protective powers of a

court of chancery may be invoked whenever necessary to fully protect such
rights." See 2 PERY, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed., 1929) § 603.
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both parties. 6 In still another case the court authorized a ninety-nineyear lease although it affected the interests of persons not yet in
esse.7 These are a few of the outstanding cases; the types of cases
and types of changes in scheme which equity may authorize are practiThe cases, indeed, in which a sale, mortgage, or lease
cally endless.'
was authorized in spite of lack of provision therefor in the terms of
the trust 9 have been so many that a large number of legislatures have
deputed to equity (or in some cases the probate court) the power to
make such transactions merely to further the best interests of the
beneficiary, and entirely apart from circumstances that threaten to
defeat the trust.10
Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (1898). The court found that
it had jurisdiction by reason of the inadequacy of remedy at law.
'Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905).
'See Hewitt v. Beattie, 138 Atl. 795 (Conn. 1927) (sale of quarry business
and pro rata division of proceeds authorized) ; Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56
N. E. 3o6 (19oo) (99-year lease authorized where the trust terms permitted
only a Io-year lease) ; Packard v. Illinois, etc. Bank, 261 Ill. 450, lO4 N. E. 275

(1914) (99-year lease and substitution of mercantile building for apartment
house authorized, where character of neighborhood changed) ; Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, io6 N. E. 497 (1914) (subdivision of land into lots, etc.
where settlor had designated agricultural purposes; reason: growth of adjacent
city) ; Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S. W. 1057 (1921) (re-investment of trust
property used in whiskey-barrel business which Prohibition had made unprofitable, authorized; but proceeds to be applied to authorized trust purposes, so that
trust might not be terminated before time fixed by settlor).
It may be noticed from the three Illinois cases preceding and those cited in
notes 6 and 7 that the "doctrine of necessity" has taken firm root in Illinois.
Other interesting cases are Brown v. Berry, 71 N. H. 271, 52 Atl. 870 (1902)
and Price v. Long, 87 N. J. Eq. 578, IOI Atl. 195 (1917).
In England the doctrine is best stated, as well as clearly applied, in It Re
New, [igoi] 2 Ch. 534 (to be further discussed in text) ; in Ireland, Neill v.
Neill, [19o4] i Ir. R. 513 (mortgage of trust property authorized where the expenditure of money was necessary to save it from ruin).
See UNDERHILL, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (8th ed., 1926) art. 46, par. 2.

' Power to mortgage: Russell v. Russell, 1O9 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648, 63
A. L. R. 783 (1929); Warren v. Pazolt, 2o3 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (1901);
Neill v. Neill, supra note 8; power to sell: Price v. Long, supra note 8. 2
Perry, op cit. supra note 5, § 674. Power to lease: see Marsh v. Reed and
Packard v. Bank, supra note 8.
"The English statute is typical. "Where in the management or administration of any property vested in trustees, any sale, lease, surrender, release, or
other disposition, or any purchase, investment, acquisition, expenditure, or other
transaction, is in the opinion of the court expedient, but the same cannot be
effected by reason of the absence of any power for that purpose vested in the
trustees by the trust instrument, if any, or by law, the court may by order confer
upon the trustees, either generally or in any particular instance, the necessary
power for the purpose, on such terms, and subject to such provisions and conditions, if any, as the court may think fit and may direct in what manner any
money authorized to be expended, and the costs of any transaction, are to be
paid or borne as between capital and income." TRUSTEE ACT, 15 GEO. 5, C. 19,
§ 57 (I) (1925). Subsequent subsections provide, inter alia, for later rescission
and variation by the court. The American acts are essentially similar, with the
exception of a few that confine such powers to real property and one (the Connecticut act) that confines the powers to testamentary trusts and places them in
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The cases so far discussed were all decided on the theory that
necessity demanded the changes authorized. And by necessity (or
emergency) is usually meant a situation threatening to defeat the
purposes of the trust. To what extent is necessity, so understood,
really a sine qua non? The most influential case on the doctrine is
the English case of In re New."- Three separate trusts were involved
:n this case. Certain shares of a limited company had been settled
in specie and were earning highly satisfactory dividends; the prospects, moreover, were that they would continue to do so. But i.
scheme for reconstruction of the company being on foot, whereby the
settled shares would have to be exchanged for new ones, the court
authorized, on behalf of all the beneficiaries-including some not yet
sui juris-the trustees' concurrence in the reconstruction plan. The
situation, as the court says, was one unforeseen by the settlor; it was,
moreover, one in which not all the beneficiaries could have given a
valid assent (some not being sui juris) ; but on the other hand, the
court's authorization certainly went beyond saving the trust from
defeat-it was calculated to produce greater profits than the settlor's
schemes had produced. In argument, indeed, the court itself indicated
its awareness of this." Not a few other English decisions (apart
from statute 13) have authorized changes that go beyond saving the
trust from defeat.' 4 Perhaps these cases may be properly understood,
as one authority suggests, as resting on the principle that obvious loss
may take either of two forms, one of them the common form of
loss that will clearly impair the estate, the other a failure to apprehend some clear, and not merely speculative, opportunity to enrich
the estate.' 5 By such a rationale we could explain cases which adopt
as their principle the saying in In re New, that a change will
not be authorized "merely because it may appear beneficial to the
estate".'"
It seems clear then that the courts will alter a trust when the
integrity of the trust corpus is threatened, or (by the suggestion ventured in rationalizing In re New) where its enrichment can be asthe court of probate. The acts are collected in 2 PERRY, op. cit supra note 5,
at 13o8, n. 4.
"Supra note 8.
"I doubt very much whether this is an emergency case. By the scheme the
nominal amount of the shares is to be increased." In re New, supra note 8,
at 544.
'By the English statute of 1925, of course, a change in investment may be
authorized on the basis of mere expediency. See § 57 (I), supra note IO.
" See Re Wells, [1903] I Ch. 848, where the contingent interests of infants
were rendered vested ones by a radical change in the trust scheme; Re Walker,
[1901] i Ch. 879, where an infant's yearly allowance was increased from 15oo to
£4ooo to enable him to live in a style befitting his prospects.
See UNDERHILL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 230.
"For example In re Tollemache [19o3] I Ch. 457, aff'd [19o3] I Ch. 955,

where it was said by Cozens-Hardy, L. J., that "In re New constitutes the highwater mark by the Court of its exercise of its extraordinary function in relation
to trusts."
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sured with reasonable certainty. In what other cases will the courts
authorize changes? In England they will do so in any case where
"the sole party beneficially interested, or the parties collectively if
there are several of them are unanimously in favor of 'breaking the
trust', and all are sui juris".1' This is a consequence of the analogy
of a trust to a common law gift, over which, having once created it,
the settlor has no power, and the analysis of the trustee's position as
that of a mere intermediary or stakeholder."8
It is doubtful, however, whether the doctrine has taken root in America. It was not even
accorded recognition in a case where the life tenant beneficiary and
the absolute remainderman agreed that certain repairs and improvements should be made on the property in trust and paid for out of
the corpus.19 The American courts commonly say that the settlor's
intention, if lawful, cannot be nullified at the instance of the beneficiaries; 20 but even so, where no further purpose than the payment
of income is found, termination will be decreed. 2 1 On the other
hand the acquisition of the absolute remainder by the beneficiary under
2
a spendthrift trust will not justify the termination of the trust.1
The English doctrine is well stated in Gosling v. Gosling 13 where the
court decreed an absolute delivery of the corpus to the beneficiary
on his coming of age, though under his father's will he was to be
a mere beneficiary until he reached the age of twenty-five. The court
said:
"If the property is once theirs [the beneficiaries'], it is useless
for the testator to attempt to impose any fetter upon their enjoyment of it in full so soon as they reach twenty-one."
The attitude of most American courts, per contra, is that such a
decree simply24 "substitutes the will of the beneficiary for the will of
the testator".
This brings us to a consideration of the rules applied to trusts
the schemes of which call for a period of accumulation. 25 In Eng7

' UNDERHILL,

op. cit. supra note

8, at

370 and

cases cited.

Ibid.
'Estate of Cole, i1S Wis. I, 94 N. W. 662 (1899). "As the testator's
scheme was worked out and inscribed in the will," says the court, "so must it be."
' See Ackerman v. Union, etc., Trust Co., 90 Conn. 63, 96 Ati. 145 (1915) ;
Re Hamburger, 185 Wis. 270, 2O N. W. 267, 37 A. L. R. 1413 (1924) (The
A. L. R. annotation is valuable); Hoffman v. New England Trust Co., 187
Mass. 205, 72 N. E. 952 (905).
Buch's Estate, 278 Pa. 185, 222 Atl. 239 (1923).
Bowlin v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97, 198 S. W. 288, 2
A. L. R. 575 (1917).
' Johns v. c. 265, 70 Eng. Rep. 423 (859).
-Magie, Chancellor, in Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, supra
note 3 at 22, Atl. at 472.
'Meaning a period less than that provided for in any of the various rules
against accumulation.
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land, as the Gosling case shows, such trusts may be terminated on
the beneficiary's becoming sui juris.2 8 In the United States they
may not. The logical basis of the English rule, if indeed there is
any, is most obscure. It may be, as we have it from high authority,
that in the first instance "the point [was] rather assumed than decided", and that
"it was apparently regarded as a necessary consequence of the
conclusion that a gift had vested, that the enjoyment of it must
be immediate on the beneficiary becoming sui juris, and could not
be postponed until a later date unless the testator had made some7
other designation of the income during the intervening period".1
Or it may be-though it is hard to see how-that "it is against public
policy to restrain a man in the use or disposition of property in which
no one but himself has any interest". 2 s Again, the English rule may
be "the outgrowth of certain earlier English decisions in the interest
of creditors, which hold, in substance, that the necessary incidents of
beneficial ownership in property are liability to creditors and the
power of alienation". 2 9 But whatever the theory, there is no pretense
that the settlor's intent is material and the3 American
courts find this
0
a sufficient reason for rejecting the doctrine.
Yet cases arise in which an infant's enjoyment is partially
or completely postponed until his majority or later, and funds are
required for his maintenance or education during infancy, so that
the courts find themselves confronted with a contingency not contemplated by the settlor. Here both English and American courts
will authorize either an increased allowance out of the income from
the corpus 31 or an appropriation from the corpus itself.3 2 In going
so far, the policy of the courts is perhaps guided by sound principle,
:'See also Grant v. Grant, 3 Y. & C. 171, 161 Eng. Rep. 661 (1833);
Josselyn v. Josselyn, 9 Sim. 63, 59 Eng. Rep. 281 (1837) ; Saunders v. Vautier,
4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841) ; Wharton v. Masterman, [1805] A. C. 186.
Lord Herschell, L. C., in Wharton v. Masterman, supra note 26, at 193.
GRAY, RuLR AGAINST PERPrUITIES (3d ed., 1915) § 12o. This explanation is soundly criticized in DeLadson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402, 407, io6 Atl.
326, 327 (1919).
' Lurton, J., in Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90, 97, 33 Sup. Ct. 686, 688
(1913).
' Shelton v. King, supra note 29; Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed.
6oi (C. C. A. 6th, i9o8) ; DeLadson v., Crawford, supra note 28; Rhoads v.
Rhoads, 43 I. 239 (1867).
' Pearce v. Pearce, I99 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 (1917) ; Blackburn v. Hawkins,
6 Ark. 5o (1845) ; Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S. W.
840 (1913) ; Aynsworth v. Pratchett, 13 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 314 (1807).
LEWIN, TRUSTS (I3th ed., 1928) 362 ff.; 2 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 615-617.
'Matter of Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. ioo (N. Y. 1819) ; Harvey v. Harvey,
2 P. Wins. 21, 24 Eng. Rep. 625 (1722). Advances for the maintenance, education, and benefit of an infant are now governed entirely by statute in England, a

trustee being permitted to make advances for these purposes at his sole discretion. See section 31 of the Trustee Act, supra note IO.
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but many courts which are met with the problem have decreed advances even when the beneficiaries' absolute interests were contingent,
with a remainder over if the beneficiary should die before the age
fixed for absolute investiture; 33 and a few go further and allow

34
In large degree
advances even though there is a vested remainder.
these decisions are a consequence of equity's especial solicitude for
infants; 1 but a sound legal justification for them is often lacking.
Yet in decreeing enough for maintenance alone the court is always
justified by the reasoning that in going beyond the settlor's expressed
intent it achieves his fundamental intent, for if the settlor desired
that the beneficiary should ultimately acquire an absolute interest in
the corpus, he certainly must have desired that the beneficiary should
live until the time fixed for the acquisition of that interest, and, presumably, live decently. Thus the common presumption is that a legacy
is intended to carry interest until it shall become absolute, and that
equity may act in loco parentisby decreeing income until such time; 36
and this presumption is reinforced by exceptional exigency in some
situations, such as the feeble-mindedness and poverty of the beneficiary."
But it is very doubtful whether allowances will be made
to such a contingent beneficiary as we have been discussing, if the
interests of persons not yet in esse may be affected; 38 the rule is
said to apply only where the beneficiaries form a class some of whom
are entitled absolutely and all of whom have an equal chance of taking
or surviving.39

'Elder v. Elder, 5o Me. 535 (1861) ; Knorr v. Millard, 52 Mich. 542, 18
N. W. 349 (1844) ; Newport v. Cook, 2 Ashm. 332 (Pa. 1841). Contra: Re
Lucey, 98 N. J. Eq. 314, 128 Atl. 677 (1925) ; Offutt v. Divine's Executor, 21
Ky. Law. Rep. 1500, 53 S. W. 816 (i8ig) ; Longley v. Hall, ii Pick. 12o (Mass.

1831); Newton v. Rebenback, go Mo. App. 65o (19Ol); Stewart v. Hamilton,
151 Tenn. 396, 270 S. W. 79, 39 A. L. R. 37 (1925)

(the A. L. R. annotation

gives an excellent collection of the authorities) ; Greenwell v. Greenwell, 5 Ves.
Jr. 194, 31 Eng. Rep. 541 (1800).
'Longworth v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, I4 N. E. 840 (1887) ; In re Allan, 17
Ch. D. 807 (1881).
' See 2 PERRY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 603. An instance of equity's solicitude is to be seen in its decrees for the conversion of an infant's property from
realty to personalty or vice versa. Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 430 (1879) ;
Bonsall's Appeal, x Rawle 266 (Pa. 1829) ; Roger's Appeal, II Pa. 36 (1849)..

PE RY §§ 605, 6o6.
Seibert's Appeal, 19 Pa. 49 (1852). See also Newport v. Cook, supra
note 33, where an advance was made for maintenance and education in spite of a
provision for a devise over to other beneficiaries if the petitioning one should die
before reaching twenty-three without having lawful issue. What would otherwise be a condition, the court says, becomes only an indication of the time when
the legacy is to be received where the context of the will shows an intent that the
beneficiary or/and his heirs shall benefit. For a discussion of the curious development of the Pennsylvania rule from a case which denied an advance in a case
like the Newport case see NoTE (1925) 39 A. L. R. 4o, at 48.
' Longworth v. Riggs, supra note 34.
' Errat v. Barlow, 14 Ves. Jr. 202, 33 Eng. Rep. 498 (3807).
' Knorr v. Millard, supra note 33; Errat v. Barlow, supra note 38.
2
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Except for the cases exemplified by Gosling v. Gosling, where
accumulation beyond the time when the beneficiary becomes sui juris
is arbitrarily prevented, all the cases so far discussed would seem to
meet on the common ground of necessity, that is, the existence at
some time in the life of the trust of a circumstance which, if some
departure from the settlor's scheme is not authorized, will defeat his
intent or purpose. Such necessity has a twofold aspect: it may
arise, as it does in the National Bank and Pennington cases, from
circumstances threatening the corpus itself, or it may arise, as it does
in the cases later discussed (again excepting the anomalous Gosling
type of case), from such want on the part of the beneficiary that a
greater demand on the corpus than the settlor has provided for seems
justifiable. But in either case necessity is at the base of the situation.
There remains another (and more infrequent) class of cases in
which a court of equity will authorize alterations. Here only slight
regard is had to the settlor's intent; the court will contravene some
essential term of the settlor's scheme -with the utmost candor. Thus
in a case where the terms of the trust called for enjoyment by A
"until he shall arrive at the age of twenty-five years, but during his
minority only so long as he is brought up" in a certain faith, the court
relieved the trust of the settlor's condition on the ground that public
policy demands a greater freedom during the formative period of
life than the condition would permit.40 In a Connecticut case 4 the
testamentary settlor had specified that none of the properties settled
should be leased for more than a year, and that on certain of them,
including property in an important business section, no building
exceeding three stories in height should be built. The length of time
during which the property was to remain in trust and the complete
uncertainty as to who would ultimately take it, the court said, precluded the thought of any intent on the settlor's part to forbid the
encumbering of the property with long leases or the burdening of
it with large buildings, so, the court concludes, the testator was only
trying to impose on the trustee "his own peculiar ideas". The conditions were held invalid because they "militated too strongly against
the interests
of the beneficiaries and the public welfare to be sus42
tained".

" Devlin's Trust Estate, 275 Pa. II, 13o Atl. 238 (1925). The practice of
relieving testamentary gifts of such religious conditions has found favor in only
a few jurisdictions. (See NoTr (1923) 25 A. L. R. 1523.) But it is nevertheless interesting as an instance of the far-reaching considerations that will move
a court of equity.
" Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown et a!., lO5 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555 (1927).
"See also Holmes v. Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 92 Conn. 507,
1O3 Atl. 64o (1918), where the court relieved a trust of the stipulation that only
so long as their husbands should abstain from liquor and tobacco were the beneficiaries to- enjoy the proceeds of the estate. The condition was said to be
"opposed to public policy" as giving the husbands a means of exercising domination over their wives.
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It is very difficult to see how such results as these can be justified.
It would seem that the trust should either succeed or fail as a whole.
To hold that so much of the trust as pleases the court shall survive,
while that which it finds contrary to "public policy" may be nullified,
is to exercise a power as arbitrary as that exercised in the application
of prerogative cy pres; for there too a certain regard is had to 3the
settlor's intent, in that a general charitable intent must be found.1
So far, in any event, has judicial paternalism in trust administration gone. But do these results perhaps prefigure even more radical
advances? The speculation is no chimerical one if one analyzes an
idea suggested by the opinion of the New Jersey court in the National
Bank case. As one of its arguments against the petition of a recalcitrant beneficiary that the entire trust be wound up, the court asserts
that the beneficiary's proposal "utterly disregards the . . . indirect
but widespread loss which would result to the public generally".
Whether dictum or part of the reason for the decision in the case, this
is an amazing suggestion. If the court is to be guided by such principles, what factors will it weigh in reaching a result? Will it,
following a characteristic equity mode of procedure, weigh the harm
that the public would suffer by a given scheme against that which the
beneficiary would suffer if authorization for that scheme should be
denied? The idea foreshadows extraordinary possibilities. Nor is it
without some semblance of precedent."
But even if it were, this
would be no argument against it. Paternalism in government is advancing on all fronts, some observers tell us. 45 In trust law, specifiIs there any logical difference between the Connecticut case or the Pennsylvania case, supra note 4o, and that of Da Costa v. De Pas, i Arnb. 228, 27
Eng. Rep. 150 (1754) where a legacy to establish a Jesuba (an assembly for
reading the Jewish law) being found contrary to public policy, the court applied
the fund to a Christian foundlings' hospital?
"In It re London's Estate, 104 Misc. 372, 171 N. Y. Supp. 981 (1918) the
trust terms provided for investment in railroad bonds yielding more than four
per cent. The trustees invested money in both New York City bonds yielding
4Y2 per cent. and Liberty Loan bonds yielding 3y/ per cent. In dealing with
the former investment the court held that the direction to invest in railroad
bonds was mandatory, and surcharged the trustees with the loss from their
investment; but the Liberty Loan bond investment was sanctioned. "A strict
and literal interpretation of the law, under normal conditions," says the court,
"would require an adjudication that such investment was unauthorized. But
these are abnormal times. . . . Under these circumstances [i. e., the pressure
of war-time necessity] the court should not be bound by narrow and restricted
rules of law and construction.

.

.

. The testator could not have foreseen

these conditions when he made his will . . . and I feel that were he alive he
would have invested in these bonds." But what the settlor would do in the
circumstances is, of course, perfectly immaterial: the trust having been created
he would have no power to alter its terms.
' See chapter XXVII, "Towards Social Democracy" in 2 BEARD, THE RISE
OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1928) 538 if, for a consideration of the vast implications of this tendency. And consider this statement, at 762: "To an everincreasing audience it became [that is, when the "machine age" got into full
swing] apparent that the law was merely a form of social and economic expression, changing with the technology and processes of society and to be understood
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cally, !t re New would have been unthinkable fifty years ago. Who
can say that the public interest will not play a part in trust administration a half century hence?
O.M.D.

DOCTRINE OF IMPUTABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE BAILOR-BAILEE RELATION-Encountering as res nova
the question whether the negligence of a bailee, concurring with that

of a third person to injure the property bailed, is to be imputed by
law to the innocent bailor so as to bar recovery by him against the

third person, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the
case of Nash v. Lang1 refused to make such imputation and allowed
the bailor to recover. In reaching this result the court followed the
clear trend of modern authorities.2
The earlier view, which is opposed to that of the Massachusetts
case, depends upon the conception of the identity of bailor and bailee
in their relation to third parties. This conception was a logical outgrowth of the early common law. Originally the bailee, being in
posesssion of the property bailed, was alone able to pursue all the
remedies of an owner. The bailor, in turn, could hold the bailee to
absolute liability.3 Later a change occurred giving the bailor the
right to bring all actions, but only if they had not already been brought
by the bailee.4 With regard to the corresponding rights of third
persons against the bailor, the earliest view held him to strict liability
for all injuries in whatever manner caused, not only by his servants,
but by his animals and by his inanimate possessions, no matter in
in connection with the living tissue of which it was a part. In these circumstances, to the consternation of jurists brought up on the common law and 'the
eternal principles of justice', there rose and flourished a new faith covered by
the lugubrious phrase 'sociological jurisprudence', and promulgated by an authority no less distinguished than Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard Law School.
Under this dispensation, it became fitting for students to inquire into the economic and psychological motives of those who made and interpreted the law,
into the 'actual social forces that had produced the existing order and were
bearing lawmakers, lawyers, and judges from timeless formalism into an endless
development.'"
1 167 N. E. 762 (Mass. 1929)

'This view is followed by a majority of the courts of this country and has
found favor also in Ireland.

Wellwood v. King, 2 Ir. R. 274 (1921)

(frequently

cited as authority in England).

33 HoLDSwoRTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW

(909) 278-280.
' Gordon v. Harper, 7 Term. Rep. 9 (1796) represents the earlier law, later
changed by Mears v. London & Southwestern R. R., ii C. B. (N S) 85o (1862)
and Hall v. Pickard, 3 Camp. 187 (1812), giving the bailor a right to maintain
an action against a third person for loss or injury to the property on the ground
that he has a reversionary interest in the property upon the termination of the
bailment. He was also allowed to bring conversion under certain circumstances:
Cooper v. Willomatt, I C. B. 672 (1845) ; Howard v. Farr, 18 N. H. 457 (1846).
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whose hands they were at the time the harm was done.5

The glaring

deficiency of the archaic theory underlying the common law rule
making ownership per se a sufficient basis of liability, compelled a
limitation of the bailor's liability. It was a Massachusetts court 6
which first, in 1874, expressed the modem rule, treating it as a settled
question that a bailor is not liable for injuries to third persons due
to the negligence of the bailee in dealing with the bailor's property.
This view found ready acceptance and has become established law.7
With this early proneness to favor the third party as against
the bailor-making him subject to suit by the bailee only, while giving
him a right of action against either bailor or bailee-and with the
additional preference for the doctrine of the identification of bailor
and bailee with regard to the property, it was but one step further
to hold this doctrine properly applied to liability for negligence. The
rule that in suits by the bailor against third persons-once these were
permitted-the contributory negligence of the bailee would bar recovery,' was thus reached. So little did the courts at first doubt the
applicability of the doctrine of imputability of negligence to cases
of bailment as well as cases of agency, that they went to no trouble
to define or to distinguish the relationship as found in a given case,
'POLLACK & MAITLAND, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 472;
HOLMES, T E CoMMON LAW (1881) 24-27.

a Herlihy v. Smith, 116 Mass. 265 (1874). Jones v. Scullard. 67 L. J. Q. B.
895 (I898) expresses the English view in accord.
7Otoupalik v. Phelps, 73 Colo. 433, 216 Pac. 541 (1923); McColligan v.
Pa. R. R., 214 Pa. 229, 63 Atl. 792 (19o6).
"The cases generally cited as enunciating the earlier rule include the following: Welty v. Indianapolis, etc. R. R., 105 Ind. 53 (1885) ; Smith v. Smith, 2
Pick. 621 (Mass. 1824) ; Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527
(1899) ; Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio 484 (1859) ; Fork's Township v. King,
84 Pa. 230 (1877) ; Texas, etc. Ry. v. Tankersley, 63 Tex. 57 (1885). These
cases are to be distinguished from (I) cases of carriers whose negligence is
generally imputed to the shipper of goods so as to prevent the latter from recovering against third parties for injury to the goods; and from (2) cases of those
hired to convey passengers, whose negligence or the negligence of whose servants, on the other hand, is no longer imputed so as to bar recovery by the passenger against the negligent third person for injuries to his person. To the first
class of cases the tendency evidenced by the principal case has not been extended,
it being said that the "carriage of goods is generally classed as a contract of
bailment different from the ordinary contract of bailment and has certain peculiarities and is governed by principles characteristic of the relation between
carrier and consignor and consignee. In that class of bailments the bailee is
also the agent of the bailor." Spelman v. Delano, 177 Mo. App. 28, 37, 163
S. W. 300 (1914).

See also Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311 (Pa. 1840).

As

for the second class of cases, the increasingly accepted rule, discussed in (1929)
77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 676, is that negligence of the driver will not be imputed
to a passenger unless there is proof of agency or interest in a joint enterprise
such as will identify the driver and the complaining passenger. From this rule
is derived the argument in Wellwood v. King, supra note 2, at 3o8, in support of
the rule of the principal case. In effect the argument is that no valid distinction
exists between injury to a person intrUfted to the care of another and injury to
property in a bailee's care, so far as the propriety of imputing negligence is concerned.

NOTES

IOlI

on the assumption that such a distinction was immaterial to the result.9
A change in this rule was but a logical sequel to the other changes
in the law of bailments indicated above. In 1897 the New Jersey
1°
repudiated
court in New York etc. R. R. v.New Jersey Electric Ry.
the application of the doctrine of imputability." Sea Insurance Co.
v. Vicksburg, etc. Ry.. 2 was the next case to express a similar view.
13
It was not until I9IO, when Pennsylvania departed from its old rule,
that the numerical weight of authority could be said to favor the view
pioneered by New Jersey.
The arguments in support of the two views are worthy of careful
examination. The earlier rule, as noted above, was at first little questioned and therefore sparingly argued.14 As the question came to be
more insistently put in issue, courts apparently found it a sufficient
reason for barring the bailor's action that he had consented to the
control of the property by the bailee and to its use in the course of
which the injury occurred. 15 Arguing from this they found such
privity between bailor and bailee as would place them in a class with
a master and servant or a principal and agent for this particular purpose. To reinforce this, an additional argument was often urged.
To take the words of one court: 36
"The bailor and bailee must recover, if at all, on the same
facts and under the same circumstances. . . . Whatever entitles
'These courts lay so little stress on the distinction between a bailee and an
agent for the purposes of applying the rule of imputability that they use the
terms almost interchangeably. The result has been to create a doubt in the
minds of some courts whether these cases did not only apparently announce what
we have stated to be the early view. See Spelman v. Delano, supra, note 8, at
33-38. This criticism is not without force, for some of the cases can be demonstrated to be weak authority (i) for lack of facts excluding the possibility that
the case involved an agency situation; and (2) for failure of the defendant to
put the question in issue at all.
1°6o N.J. L. 338, 38 Atl. 828 (1897).
'That is, repudiated its application to a bailment where no agency or joint
enterprise existed.
159 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 5th, i9o8).
' Fork's Township v. King, supra note 8, expressed the Pennsylvania attitude in favor of the old rule, but was overruled by the case of Gibson v. Bessemer, etc. R. R., 226 Pa. 198, 75 AtI. 194 (191o).
" Supra note 9. In Fork's Township v. King there was no discussion of
the question; nor in Texas, etc. Ry. v. Tankersley, both supra note 8.
"In Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Sims, supra note 8, the court, without hesitation,
groups principal and agent, master and servant, bailor and bailee in the same
class for this particular purpose. It does, however, make two requirements:
(i) that at the time the harm was done the property was being -used for the
very purpose for which it was loaned, and (2) that the bailor voluntarily intrusted the property to the bailee for such use. Similarly, in Welty v. Indianapolis, etc. R. R., supra note 8, the court held that the borrower stood to the
third party as the owner of the property, because the owner had placed it in the
borrower's possession and control.
"Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Sims, supranote 8, at 327, 27 So. at 528.
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to a recovery, entitles either bailor or bailee to such recovery.
E converso, whatever forbids a recovery to the bailee will also
defeat the bailor's action."

A most thorough discussion favoring the old view is to be found in
Wellwood v. King
in the argument before the King's Bench, the
judges being unanimously in accord with the present minority rule.
One consideration urged against the modern rule is that if the bailor is
permitted to recover against the third party, the latter must bear
the entire loss, in as much as he cannot proceed against the bailee.
The third party is consequently deprived entirely of the defense which
would normally be afforded him by the law of contributory negligence.
Moreover, to allow the bailor to recover against the third party would
impose on the latter much the same responsibility as attaches to the
bailee as a result of the contract of bailment.18 Emphasis is laid on
the absurdity of making the defendant's liability in an action for the
same injury to the same chattel, seeking damages that shall enure for
the benefit of the same person, depend "upon the quiddity whether
the bailor or the bailee was the first litigant. The right to sue by
a bailee for injury to a chattel depends upon possession, and that of
the bailor upon ownership; but these incidents of proprietorship and
possession in respect of the same chattel by two persons [are] essentially different when viewed in relation to actions for damage to the
subject of the bailment from those which are involved in actions
by an individual for negligence causing injury to his person or to his
property not the subject of bailment suchas this". 19
In answer to these arguments it was first contended that bailor
and bailee are independent of each other in regard to the property
bailed.'0 The rule as changed, that a bailor is not liable to third persons for the negligence of the bailee, is offered in illustration of such
independence. This independence once granted, it follows, according
to their argument, that the general rule of the liability of joint tortfeasors, to the effect that neither one may use the fault of the other
as a defense in an action against himself, 2' applies in favor of the
bailor just as it does to the case of any other innocent party who has
been injured by the concurrent negligence of two persons, here the
bailee and the third person. Denying the force of the attempted distinction between the case of injury to the property, as in the principal

"Supra note

2, 276-290.

Ibid. 279.
"Ibid. 289. This distinction is ignored by courts holding in accord with
the principal case; see supra note 8.
'New York, etc. R. R. v. New Jersey Electric Ry., suprd note 10, at 344.
The court pointed to the independent rights and obligations of bailor and bailee
as between themselves, under the ordinary contract of bailment.
'Washington, etc. R. F. v. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521, 17 Sup. Ct. 661 (1897);
Newcomb v. New York Cent., etc. R. R., 169 Mo. 4o9, 69 S. W. 348 (1902);
COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. i9o6) go, n. 16.

NOTES

case, and injury to a person, as in the case of a passenger hurt by the
combined negligence of the driver of the vehicle conveying him and
a third person, the courts adopting the present majority view argue
that the law established in the latter class of cases is equally applicable
2to the first class; that the contributory negligence is not imputable..
In neither of the two classes above is there any agency or control
such as would identify the person or owner injured with one of the
such agency or some privity modern courts
tort-feasors. Without
23
refuse to impute.

24
The arguments reviewed above were looked upon with favor
and were used effectively to shatter the thorough argument of the
when the case was
court of the King's Bench in Wellwood v. King,
25
further considered by the Court of Appeals.
Whether one or the other set of arguments shall have the greater
weight depends ultimately upon which party-the bailor or the third
person-is to be favored. To hold with the majority is to deprive
the third party of a defense accorded him by the law of contributory
negligence for the same act, the same degree of guilt and the same
injury, the only difference in the facts being that the person in charge
of the property at the time of the injury is not the owner thereof.
To side with the minority would deprive an innocent person of a
remedy against the wrong-doing third person, merely because of the
fault of the bailee, for whom the bailor should not be responsible
since he did not control him.
An examination of the theories underlying the law of contributory negligence is of but little assistance in choosing between the two
views. One theory admits a right on each side, saying that since it
is impossible to apportion the damages between the two tort-feasors,
neither may recover.28 This might be used in support of the minority
view by arguing that it is unfair to apply the rule of contributory
negligence on the one hand to cancel what rights the third person has
gained as a result of the bailee's negligence, and at the same time
leave him open to full liability for the same act and the same injury.

'New York, etc. R. R. v. New Jersey Electric Ry., supra note 10,
346-348. The court in Sea Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, supra note 12, likewise cites
cases refusing to impute negligence to passengers in support of its decision:
Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391 (1885) ; The Bernina, 12 P. D.
58 (i886). It applies the general rule as to joint tort-feasors and bases the
independence of bailor and bailee on the fact (i) that their duties and obligations
are dissimilar and (2) the bailor has no actual control over the bailee.
. Spelman v. Delano, supra note 8, at 39. The courts says: "The
rule is confined to those bailments which do not involve any privity of contract
or agency between the bailor and bailee." Currie v. Consolidated Ry., 81 Conn.
383, 71 Ati. 356 (igo8). The carrier cases serve as illustrations of bailments
involving privity of contract: Simpson v. Hand, supra note 8.
" Bradley v. Ashworth, 21H Ala. 395, ioo So. 663 (924) ; Fischer v. Internat.
Ry.,

112 Misc. 212, 182 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1920.
'Supra note 2, 295-309. The decision is

Bernina, supra note 23 (a passenger case).
' Stiles v. Geesey, 21 Smith 439 (Pa. 1872).

based on the authority of The
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The second theory, that contributory negligence bars recovery because
the plaintiff's act broke the chain of causation,2 could be used also
in support of the minority view, for it removes the necessity of demonstrating the identity of bailor and bailee and prevents recovery by
anyone for injury due to the defendant's act, on the ground that,
as a matter of fact, the latter's act was not the proximate cause of
the injury. On the other hand, a third theory of contributory negligence, that it bars recovery in order to insure prudence and care,2 s
and a fourth, that one who invites injury may not make it the basis of
a recovery,2 9 may be urged in aid of the majority view, for the bailor
was never lacking in care nor did he invite the injury unless he can
be said to have done so by the act of giving custody and control to
the bailee.
It is not so much a matter of logic, therefore, as of the policy
of the courts today, to favor the bailor and to require as a basis of
liability not mere ownership, as was earliest held, nor even voluntary
surrender of possession to another's control with permission to use in
a specified manner; but more than that, the relation of master and
servant, principal and agent or of persons engaged in a joint enterprise. The increasing popularity of the majority view, as evidenced
by the principal case, 0 decided in a court not theretofore committed
to either view, is indicative of the soundness of the policy underlying
it,"' and of the fact that the majority view, better than the minority,
conforms to the needs of present social conditions and to the prevailing
moral sense of the community.
G. H.
"45 C. J. 941.
Ilbd. In connection with this, see also BOHLEN, STUDIES
TORTS (1926)

IN THE

LAW OF

500-535.

"Schnackenburg & Co. v. D. L. & W. R. R., 86 N. J. L. 517, 93 Atl. 701
(94).
"Nash v. Lang, supra note I.
'That public policy may in the future demand an exception to the rule of

the principal case in the situation where the nature of the article bailed and the
purpose for which it is bailed renders it a dangerous instrumentality, is suggested

by the recent case of Kernan v. Webb, 148 Atl. 186 (R. I. 1929). In this case
the bailor of an automobile was held liable for the negligence of the bailee under
a statute providing that in case of accident the bailee shall be deemed the agent
of the bailor. A Florida case reaches the same result without a statute, Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 8o Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). Michigan passed such a statute in 1929, Pub. Acts. Mich. 1929, No. 19, § 29; as also
New York, Laws of N. Y. 1929, c. 54, § 59; California, Stat. of 1909, c. 253,
§ 62; Conn. Acts of 1925, ch. 195, § 21. For further discussion, see Heyting,
Automobiles ahd Vicarious Liability (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 225. It is interesting
to speculate how far such statutes will be adopted elsewhere, and whether the
identity recognized under such a statute will bar an action by the bailor against
a third party, where the bailee was also negligent or will only be deemed to
exist for purposes of suit by third parties against the bailor.

NOTES
EFFECT OF NOTICE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON DAMAGES
FOR NoN-DELVERY BY CAmE-The rule of damages in actions

of contract is governed by a series of decisions grounded on the leading
case of Hadley v. Baxendale.1 Under the first half of the rule of this
frequently cited case the amount recoverable is compensation for the
"natural and proximate" consequences of the breach of a simple
contract. However, under the second part of the rule, where one
party to a contract makes known to the other at the time of the contract certain special facts which would give him notice that a breach
of the contract would result in an otherwise unexpected loss, ordinarily the former may recover that special loss in case of a breach.
A contract of carriage, however, is deemed a special contract, and
for a breach thereof resulting in loss or destruction of property
a special measure of damages, subordinate to the first half of the
Hadley rule is applied in the absence of notice of special facts, namely,
the market value of the goods at the time and place of delivery if
delivery had been made
as agreed, less carriage charge to destination
2
if not already paid.

While courts are agreed upon these general principles, their
proper application to certain factual situations is not always clear,

and considerable confusion has thus resulted. The questions of notice
and the proper meaning of the term market value, as between wholesale and retail values, were the points before the court in Yazoo & M.
V. R. R. v. Clarksdale Coal & Grain Co.3 In this case the appellee
sought to recover on the basis of resale prices at retail for the loss of
a carload of coal by the carrier. It was claimed that the railroad
company knew that the coal was to be sold at retail, and presumably at
a profit in such resales. But the showing in this regard was only the
general one that the railroad company knew that the appellee was in
the retail coal business. The court held:
"It is the settled law of this state that a common carrier of
freight cannot be held for special damages unless the shipper gives
notice of such damages at the time the goods are delivered to
the carrier."
The court then proceeded to state the rule of damages in the absence
of notice to be as follows:
"The true measure of damages for breach of a contract to
transport and deliver coal at a certain place and time is the amount
it would have been necessary for the shipper or owner to pay in
'9 Ex. 341, 23 L. J.Ex. 179 (1854); I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed.
1916) 170; I SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 267.
2 Central R. R. v. Amer. Coal Co., 28 Ga. App. 95, 1iO S. E. 320 (1922);
Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 35 (1875); Ruppel v. Allegheny Valley R. R.,
167 Pa. 166, 31 Atl. 478 (1895) ; 3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 3386-

3389.

2 125 So. 725 (Miss. 1930).
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the open market at the time and place of delivery for such a
quantity and kind of coal or other property as the carrier failed
to deliver as agreed."
The courts have found it difficult to adhere to any uniform rules
regarding the sufficiency of notice required to render a carrier liable
for special damages. The same divergence of opinion exists where
consequential damages are sought from carriers as where such damages are claimed from vendors of personal property. It can perhaps
be safely stated that in England and the United States the cases have
generally given special damages where they have been brought within
the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach at
or before 4 the time of contracting by communicating the special circumstances. 5 Notice, therefore, which would inform the carrier that
the damages to be anticipated in the event of a breach would be greater
than ordinarily attends the carriage of such freight is held by most
courts to be sufficient. 6 Although constructive notice has been held
insufficient to render a carrier liable for special damages,7 the decided
weight of authority holds that if it appears from the nature of the
goods shipped or from other circumstances that the carrier ought to
have known of the consequence, it is charged with notice of such
circumstances although positive information or notice was not given."
The above rules have been applied to the liability of carriers
regardless of the fact that they are bound to serve all who apply.
Judicial dissatisfaction with these prevailing rules of notice has, however, been evidenced in many decisions. In some cases a greater
particularity of notice is held to be a condition precedent to liability
' Bradley v. Chicago, etc. R. R., 94 Wis. 44, 68 N. W. 410 (1896) ; 3 SUTHELAND, op. cit. supra note i,§ 902; cf. Asher v. Howard, 178 Ky. 398, 198 S. W.
1749 (1917); see 2 WILLISToN, SALEs (1924) § 599c. No doubt notice subsequent to formation of the contract of sale yet prior to the breach is insufficient.
But see Bourland v. Choctaw, etc. R. R., 99 Tex. 407, 90 S. W. 483 (0905),
(i9o6) 3 L. R. A. (N s) ii. This case does not contravene the general rule
but makes a distinction between loss during transportation and loss after reaching destination. In case goods have been received at point of destination notice
at that time will permit recovery of special damages for subsequent loss before
delivery to the owner.
'Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Bryne, 2o5 Ill. 9,68 N. E. 72o (19o3) ; Illinois Cent.
R. R. v. Nelson, 30 Ky. 114, 97 S. W. 957 (i9o7); Swift River Co. v.
Fitchburg R. R., 769 Mass. 326, 47 N. E. ioio (7897); Lewark v. R. R. 137
N. C. 383, 49 S.E. 882 (1905) ; Clyde Coal Co. v. Pittsburg, etc. R. R., 226 Pa.
391, 75 Atl. 596 (igio) ; Hadley v. Baxendale, supra note i.
Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N. Y. 32, ii9 N. E. 76 (i918) (mere notice to
express company to rush is not sufficient notice for recovery of special damages) ; Kolb v. Southern Ry., 8i S. C. 536, 62 S.E. 872 (i9o8) ; Illinois Cent.
R. R. v. Johnson, ii6 Tenn. 624, 94 S.W. 6oo (79o6).
' British Columbia etc. Spar, etc. Co. v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499 (1868).
' Harper Furniture Co. v. Southern Express Co., 148 N. C. 87, 62 S. E
145 (908).

See also (i9io) 3o L. R. A. (irs) 483 for additional late citations.

Early citations are found in (1900) 53 L. R. A. 33; Hydraulic Eng. Co. v.
Huffie, 4 Q. B. D. 670, 23 E. R. C. 558 (1878).

NOTES

for unusual damages in cases involving carriers. 9 The tendency of
the decisions in the United States and England appears to be in this
direction, thus requiring a consent to be bound for more than ordinary
damages, otherwise special damages shall not be deemed to be within
the contemplation of the parties.'0
Several reasons have been advanced for this requisite of notice
to enable the owner of goods to recover special damages."- The principal reason seems to be that the party contracting to deliver the goods
assumes a liability only for those damages which would in the usual
and ordinary course of things, result from his failure to perform;
because it is only these that he is required to foresee, unless it is
shown that knowledge of an unusual situation of the other party
has been brought to his attention, and he has contracted with reference
thereto.' 2
The effect of notice under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is to
delimit the boundaries of ordinary expected loss.' 8 The carrier is
thus apprised of additional consequences which might result in case
of a breach of its contract of carriage. As a result it is possible to
recover damages for loss of profits. 4 The courts, however, watch
to see if profits are too remote or whether there is a basis for computing them in a given case.'5 The anticipated profits of a business
'Home v. Midland R. R., 8 C. P. 131, 5 E. R. C. 5o6 (1873); British
Columbia, etc. Spar Co. v. Nettleship, supra note 7. For additional citations
see (igoo) 53 L. R. A. 86 et seq.
Detmer Wallon Co. v. D. L. & W. R. R., 89 Misc. 252, 253,

853

N. Y.

Supp. 287, 289 (1915). "Such damages may not be recovered unless by the
terms of the contract or by direct notice, they are within the expectation of the
parties so that it plainly appears that they were within the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made." Home v. Midland R. R., supra note 9.
The notice must inform the carrier of plaintiff's business and the special need
of the property, 3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note I, § 902.
Chicago, etc. R. R. v. King, 104 Ark. 215, 148 S. W. 1005 (1912) (notice
gives the carrier an opportunity to protect itself by special precaution against
delay in transportation). In Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 85 S. C. i9, 67
S. E. ii (igio) it was pointed out that to allow other damages would add to
terms of the contract another element of damages not contemplated by the
parties.
"Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Brothers, 12 Ala. App. 351, 67 So. 628 (1914);
Bourland v. Choctaw, etc. R. R., supra note 4.
'I
SEDGWICK, op. cit supranote I, § 157.
"4 Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. R. v. Hansford & Son, 125 Ky. 37, I S. W.
251 (19o7); Woonsocket Machine & Press Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R.,
239 Mass. 211, 131 N. E. 461 (192i); Smith v. New York 0. & W. Ry., 119
Misc. 5o6, i96 N. Y. Supp. 521 (1922); Texas & Pac. R. R. v. Payne, 15 Tex.
Civ. App. 58, 38 S. W. 366 (1896) ; but see Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R. R. v.
McLean, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 236, 91 S. W. 825 (i9o6). There can be little
doubt that in the early part of the 19th century it was generally considered that
profits did not form a part of a plaintiff's schedule of damages. Archer v.
Williams, 2 C. & K. 26 (Eng. 1846); The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546

(U. S. 1818).

"Siluruan Mineral Springs Co. v. Kuhn, 65 Neb. 646, 9i N. W. 5o
(i92) ; Noble v. Amer. Three Color Co., 37 Misc. 96, 74 N. Y. Supp. 764

(i9o2).
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are generally so dependent upon numerous and uncertain contingencies that their amount is not susceptible of proof with any reasonEarlier authorities, for this reason, were
able degree of certainty.1
inclined to hold that contemplated profits were per se improper elements of damage. The weight of modern authority either holds or
concedes, that where a loss of profits is not too remote or conjectural
to be susceptible of computation with reasonable accuracy, it is a proper
Thus, where a carrier has notice of special
element of damage."
circumstances requiring the prompt delivery of a specific article to be
used in the owner's business, and the profits that would have accrued
are so definite and certain that they can be ascertained reasonably by
calculation, such profits constitute an element of damage for which
the owner may recover. This rule has been applied in a variety of
cases, for example, where a carrier failed to deliver theatrical prop19
erty,'" or parts of machinery necessary for the operation of a mill.
In general, there is a striking similarity with the measure of
damages for breach of contracts of sale where special facts are disclosed. Ordinarily, the measure of damages for the breach of a
contract of sale is the difference between the contract price and the
20
However,
market price of the goods when the contract is broken.
where the vendor has been notified, before entering the contract in
question, of facts indicating that unusual damages will follow his
failure to perform his agreement, he is liable for such damages. Mr.
Williston states: 21
"Common consequential damages of this sort recoverable by
the vendee are those suffered from loss of a resale. . . . The
seller may have had notice of a sub-contract but not of the price at
which the resale was to be made. In such a case he will be liable
for such ordinary profit as might be expected on resale."
It has already been pointed out that in the absence of notice of
special facts, the measure of damages for goods lost or destroyed by
a carrier is the market value at the time and place of delivery, if
" Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, III Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Harris, 121 Ga. 707, 49 S. E. 703 (1905) ; Ft.
Smith R. R. v. Williams, 30 Okla. 726, 121 Pac. 275 (1912) ; and cases cited in
(912) 40 L. R. A. (N s) 494.
'Weston v. Boston, etc. R. R., igo Mass. 298, 76 N. E. 1O5O (i9o6) (loss
of profits for delay in delivering theatrical scenery were recovered). But see
McMeekin v. Southern Ry., 82 S. C. 468, 64 S. E. 413 (igog) ; Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. R. v. Planter's Gin & Oil Co., 88 Ark. 77, 113 S. W. 352 (i9o8) (where
the launching of a new business is delayed by the carrier, loss of profits cannot
be recovered).
v. Missouri P. R. R., 140 Mo. App. 200, 123 S. W. 1034 (1920).
SMorrow
2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 599.
'Jordan v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473, 35 Atl. 521 (1896); Delafield v.
Armsby Co., 131 App. Div. 572, 116 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1911), aff'g igg N. Y.
518, 92 N. E. 1O83 (igio) ; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 599 d.
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delivery had been made as agreed. In applying this universal rule,
an examination of the cases discloses an entire absence of harmony
especially in cases involving the loss of fungible goods.12 It will be
noticed that in some cases damages have been measured by the retail
value, whereas in others the wholesale value has been applied.
The fundamental basis of damages is compensation for the .njury
suffered.2 3 Thus, if a carload of coal were destroyed, the carrier
could compensate the owner for his loss by paying damages which
would permit the owner to replace his coal. To accomplish this end
it would only be necessary for the court to award damages on the basis
of wholesale prices. An award based upon retail prices would include
a retail profit which was not strictly speaking a loss suffered by the
owner. By the Cummins Amendment 2 4 the holder of a bill of lading
issued for an interstate rail shipment is entitled to recover for the
failure to make delivery of any part of the shipment without legal
excuse, "the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such property" at
point of destination. Having regard for the common law and statutory basis of damages it would seem, therefore, in the absence of
notice of special facts that the retail market value would be an
improper measure of damages. The Supreme Court of the United
States in the recent case of Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Crail2 5 enunciated
a very elastic rule when it held that in the absence of special circumstances, damages for shortage in delivery by the seller of fungible
goods sold by quantity is measured by the bulk price rather than the
retail price. Apparently this rule applies particularly to dealers in
view of the fact that there are less apt to be special circumstances
requiring them to replace the exact quantity of goods destroyed in
which case they can replace from subsequent bulk purchases at wholesale prices. In the event that there is a necessity for replacing the
exact quantity destroyed which possibly cannot be purchased at
Cases directly bearing upon this question are: Brown Coal Co. v. Illinois

Cent. R. R., I96 Iowa 562, 192 N. W. 92o (1923), in which it was held that the

cost at the mine was the basis of damages and consequently contra to the general rule. Leominster Fuel Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 258 Mass. i49,
154 N. E. 831 (927).

It does not appear that there was any wholesale price

at destination, nevertheless the court stresses the fact that the plaintiff was
under no obligation to buy another carload of coal in order to reduce damages
and awarded retail price as basis of damages. Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Delta
Grocery & Cotton Co., 134 Miss. 846, 98 So. 777 (924) (wholesale price recovered for loss of a few barrels from a carload) ; Heidritter Lumber Co. v. Cent.
R. R. of N. J., ioo N. J. L. 402, 122 Atl. 691 (I924) (retail value at destination
was held to have been the proper measure of damages); Roth Coal Co. v.
Louisville & N. R. R., i42 Tenn. 52, 215 S. W. 404 (1919)

(court allowed retail

price minus price of marketing and freight charges). It is to be noticed that in
the last case there was no wholesale price at destination. See Crutchfield &
Woolfolk v. Director General of R. R., 239 Mass. 84, 131 N. E. 340 (1921);
Smith v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., supra note 14.
23I SUTHERLAND, op. Cit. supra note I, § 2281.
2449 U. S. C. A. §20 (1I) (1928).
'5o Sup. Ct. ISo (930).
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wholesale price because of the small quantity needed to replace the
loss, it would seem that the rule would permit the replacement at
retail prices. By adopting this liberal rule the Supreme Court has
permitted compensation well within the measure outlined by the
Cummins Amendment.
In the event that the goods which have been destroyed by the
carrier have no market price, their value is usually held to be the
value of the goods to the owner, taking into account such practical
considerations as its cost and the expense of replacing it without
reference to what it would sell for in a particular market. Any
fanciful or imaginary value they may have to the owner is disregarded. 26 All that can be considered is the value of the article in
money to the owner.
In as much as carriers are not free to refuse goods offered for
transportation but are under a duty to accept goods for carriage from
all who apply, special damages for lost or delayed property should
not be recovered azainst the carrier unless it has been clearly and sufficiently informed of the special facts by the owner. Greater particularity regarding notice than is required under the Hadley rule would
still protect shippers and permit the recovery of special damages.
J. J. McD.
"'Cooney v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 121 Ala. 368,

25

So.

712

(1899);

Mitchell v. Weir, ig App. Div. 183, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1O85 (1897); Lloyd v.
Haugh & Keenan Storage & Transfer Co., 223 Pa. 148, 72 At1. 516 (igog).

